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This study develops a theoretical framework of heterogeneous consumer preferences to examine the 
effect of voluntary and mandatory country of origin labeling (COOL) on consumer purchasing 
decisions and welfare when consumers view COOL information as an attribute that differentiates 
products vertically and horizontally. Analytical results of both the vertically and horizontally 
differentiated product models show that the change from a no COOL to a mandatory COOL regime 
decreases (increases) the welfare of consumers with weak (strong) preference for COOL. A change 
from a no COOL to a voluntary COOL regime leads to an undisputed increase in consumer welfare 
which results from an increase in the welfare of consumers with strong preference for COOL, while 
the welfare of consumers with weak preference for COOL remains unchanged. A change from a 
voluntary to a mandatory COOL regime leads to a consumer welfare loss in the vertically 
differentiated product model and in the horizontally differentiated product model when product 
relocation is prohibitively costly. In both the above models, a switch from voluntary to mandatory 
COOL decreases the welfare of consumer with weak preference for COOL, while it keeps the 
welfare of consumers with strong preference for COOL unchanged. A change from a voluntary to a 
mandatory COOL regime in the horizontally differentiated product market when product relocation 
is possible leads to a decrease in the welfare of consumer with both weak and strong preference for 
COOL and to possible welfare gains for those consumers who place greater value in country of 
origin information under mandatory than under voluntary COOL. 
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1. Introduction   
In the absence of labeling the country of origin of a product is a credence attribute. Labeling can be 
used as a means of differentiating products and facilitating consumer purchasing decisions by 
transforming credence attributes into search attributes. In recent years, the increasingly expressed 
need of consumers to be informed about credence product attributes in general (e.g., the process of 
genetic modification) and country of origin in particular, has motivated policy makers to establish 
and implement labeling policies related to a product’s country of origin.  
The European Union, through its regulations (EEC) 2081/92 and (EEC) 2082/92 protects 
and promotes labeling policies of agricultural products (European Commission Directorate-General 
for Agriculture 2004) and through its regulation NO 1760/2000 requires that all member countries 
indicate the country of origin of beef and beef products (The New Rules Project-Agriculture 2003). 
Japan, under the amended Agricultural Standard (JAS) law requires country of origin for all grocery 
products ((Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) 2004)). Canada, under the Canadian Cattle 
Identification Agency (CCIA) requires all cattle to be tagged with an approved CCIA ear tag before 
their herd of origin (CCIA 2005). Mexico, under the Certification Labeling Decree requires COOL 
on more than 400 products (Gatti 1995). 
In the US, mandatory country of origin labeling regulation for agricultural products was 
issued by the US congress on May 13, 2002 (the 2002 Farm Bill) and the law was supposed to 
become effective by September 30, 2004.
1 However, the implementation of mandatory COOL has 
been delayed twice for some of the covered commodities and is now supposed to become effective 
in September 2008; in the meantime COOL remains voluntary.
2 Commodities that are currently 
                                                 
1 The US Department of Agriculture (USDA)/Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) is responsible for issuing and 
implementing the regulations for mandatory country of origin labeling. 
2 In January 27, 2004, President Bush signed the public law 108-199 delaying the implementation of mandatory COOL 
until September 30, 2006 and in November 10, 2005 he signed the public law 109-97, delaying the implementation of 
mandatory COOL until September 30, 2008.    3
covered by mandatory COOL are wild and farm-raised fish and shellfish while the rest of the 
commodities for which COOL implementation has been delayed include muscle cuts of beef 
(including veal), lamb and pork; ground beef, ground lamb, and ground pork; fresh and frozen fruits 
and vegetables; and peanuts.
3  
The proposed COOL law requires retailers to credibly inform consumers of the country of 
origin of covered commodities by using a clear and visible sign. For this information to be 
transferred to consumers, all firms in the supply chain for the covered commodities are expected to 
be affected by the proposed rule (USDA/AMS 2003).
4 The cost of implementing the COOL 
program is expected to be higher for the meat industries, compared to other agricultural industries, 
due to the different stages of processing and the different number of participants in the supply chain 
that are covered by the regulation. It is also expected that the cost of labeling products with mixed 
origin will be higher than for domestic products, due to the higher cost of obtaining and verifying 
the related information (USDA/AMS 2003). 
COOL has incited great controversy both in the literature and in the political arena. COOL 
proponents argue that US consumers have the right to know where their products are coming from 
and to choose their products from the country that they have confidence in. The studies conducted 
by Sterns et al. (2004), Umberger et al. (2003), and Loureiro and Umberger (2003) find that a large 
group of consumer prefer products with COOL and are willing to pay a premium for them. These 
studies also showed that consumers may use the information provided by COOL as an indicator of 
                                                 
3The law requires that for beef, lamb and pork to carry the US country of origin, they should be born, raised, and 
slaughtered in the US; for fish and shellfish hatched to carry, they should be raised, harvested in the US; and for fresh 
and frozen fruits and vegetables, and peanuts to carry the US country of origin label, they should be grown in the US. 
Otherwise the covered commodities will carry other country of origin label which could be a mixed origin label if the 
product comes from more than one country ((US Department of Agriculture/Agricultural Marketing Service, 
(USDA/AMS) 2003). 
4Products and services exempt of the COOL legislation include food services such as restaurants and cafeterias, the 
poultry sector and small retailers that have invoice cost of all purchases of produce of less than $230,000. The law 
contains enforcement provisions of $10,000 for each violation that could be made by both retailers and suppliers 
(USDA/AMS 2003). 
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evaluating food safety and product quality. COOL supporters also argued that groups representing 
the majority of US producers such as The National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA), the 
National Pork Producers Council (NPPC), the National Fisheries Institute (NFI), the United Fresh 
Fruit and Vegetable Association (UFFVA) and the Produce Marketing Association (PMA) are 
supporting COOL regulation. According to these groups, US producers have already invested time 
and resources to meet strict US government regulations related to food safety and quality and 
labeling will allow them to promote, market and advertise their products, increase their market 
share and realize greater returns (Farmers’ Advance 2004). Buhr (2003) suggests that the impact of 
COOL on the firms in the supply chain could be positive, even without any increase in consumer 
willingness to pay while Becker (1999) suggests that the cost of implementing COOL is minimal.  
COOL opponents, on the other hand, argue that traceability related to COOL can only trace 
the product back to the farmer and may not provide consumers with information about credence 
attributes other than the country of origin. At the same time, critics argue that it is unclear whether 
consumers use the information provided by COOL as an indirect way of evaluating food product 
quality and safety. A study conducted by Dickinson and Bailey (2002) indicates that, in the case 
where beef traceability/COOL was not combined with other attributes related to food safety, 
consumers did not have a strong desire for traceability/COOL and they were willing to pay the 
minimum premium for it. COOL opponents also argue that the costs of implementing COOL will 
be large and if COOL is a quality indicator for consumers, it is more efficient for firms to signal 
quality directly to consumers through quality verification institutions rather than by using COOL or 
traceability guarantee as an indirect quality signal (Hobbs 2003). Another criticism is that COOL 
will likely create a trade barrier by increasing the cost of imported products and by encouraging the 
perception that foreign products are less safe compared to domestic products (Becker 1999).    5
Food handlers, including processors, are the main group opposing COOL. According to a 
study conducted by Schupp and Gillespie (2001) these groups perceive COOL as an unnecessary 
and undesirable intervention in free trade and commerce by the government and argue that COOL 
will reduce firms’ opportunities of freely substituting between imported and domestic products and 
will subsequently increase firms’ costs. 
According to the USDA the lack of participants in voluntary COOL programs in the last 
three years provides evidence that consumers do not have a strong preference for country of origin 
labeling and will not increase their purchases and willingness to pay for the covered commodities. 
In addition, according to USDA estimates COOL implementation costs will outweigh the benefits 
of the program and will result in an increase in food prices and a decrease in production in the next 
decade. The USDA estimates the net economic effect from COOL implementation to be negative 
and to range between $138 and $596 million (USDA/AMS 2003).
5  
Lusk and Anderson (2004), Brester et al. (2004) and Hanselka et al. (2004) studied the effect 
of country of origin labeling on economic welfare. The results of these studies indicated that an 
increase in consumer demand is necessary to offset the incremental costs from implementing COOL 
on both consumer and producer welfare for both the beef and the pork sectors. The results of these 
studies also indicated that consumer and producer surplus for the poultry sector (a substitute product 
                                                 
5 On November 21, 2002, the USDA published an estimate of recordkeeping costs for the covered commodities in the 
Federal Register (“a Notice of Request for Emergency Approval of a New Information Collection (67 FR 70205) for the 
Interim Guidelines for Voluntary Country of Origin Labeling”). The estimated first-year incremental costs of 
establishing and maintaining the recordkeeping associated with COOL for all affected industries was $1.968 billion 
(USDA/AMS 2003). After receiving feedback from a number of affected firms that have already begun to make 
changes in their operations to implement the proposed rules and from various studies that have estimated COOL costs 
(e.g., VanSickle et al. (2003), Sparks companies, Inc., and Cattle Buyers Weekly (Sparks/CBW) (2003), Hayes and 
Meyer (2003), Davis (2003)), in October 2003, the USDA developed a range of estimated incremental costs for the first 
year for the affected firms. The lower range was $582 million and reflects the minimum cost needed to modify and 
maintain an existing recordkeeping system while the upper range was $3.9 billion and reflects the cost of establishing a 
recordkeeping system and other capital and labor costs and expenses needed to implement the proposed rule. It is 
expected that the ongoing cost will be lower than the first year costs; according to the USDA estimations the ongoing 
cost is $458 million, including maintenance and operation of recordkeeping costs.   6
that is not covered by COOL) will be positive as consumers substituted the relatively more 
expensive beef and pork products for the relatively less expensive poultry. 
Even though existing studies shed some light on the expected costs and benefits of the 
implementation of COOL, definitive conclusions about the nature and magnitude of these costs and 
benefits as well as the effect of COOL on economic welfare cannot be drawn given the lack of 
consensus in the literature. However, there is consensus in the literature as to that consumer 
attitudes towards COOL information and the value that consumers place on this information are not 
homogenous. That is, consumers may use information concerning the country of origin as an 
indicator of product quality and/or because they value other characteristics related to the product’s 
place of origin (e.g., support for the country’s economy, fond memories of a given country, 
consumer sense of belonging to a certain country). 
Schupp and Gillespie (2001) suggest that the majority of Louisiana consumers consider US 
beef to be of a better quality than imported beef. Umberger et al. (2003) argue that food safety 
concerns, a strong desire to support US producers and beliefs that the US beef is of higher quality, 
were reasons that Chicago and Denver consumers preferred COOL. Haucap et al. (1997) find that 
consumers use COOL information as a signal for product quality and that countries with high 
production costs must produce high quality products to be competitive in international markets. 
Ittersum et al. (2003) find that the purchasing decisions of consumers in the Netherlands are 
influenced by consumer sense of belonging to the country of origin and the information available in 
memory about the country to which the product belongs. A similar survey in Italy on extra virgin 
olive oil indicates that consumer awareness combined with strong and favorable association with 
the region, have a positive and direct influence on regional product preference (Lans et al. 2001). 
The contribution of the present study is that it develops a theoretical framework to examine 
the market and consumer welfare effects of COOL that allows for consumer heterogeneity in terms   7
of consumer preferences for the provision of country of origin information. Specifically, the study 
examines and compares the market and consumer welfare effects of mandatory and voluntary 
COOL when consumers view COOL information as an attribute that differentiates products 
vertically and when they view it as an attribute that differentiates products horizontally.  
The models developed in this study build on previous work by Giannakas (2002), Giannakas 
and Yiannaka (2003) and Giannakas and Fulton (2004), who study the purchasing decisions of 
heterogeneous consumers in vertically differentiated markets. In addition to analyzing the effects of 
mandatory and voluntary COOL on consumption decisions and consumer welfare in vertically 
differentiated markets, this study also examines the above effects in horizontally differentiated 
markets. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section two develops a model of 
heterogeneous consumers that view COOL as a vertical attribute and examines the market and 
consumer welfare effects of mandatory and voluntary country of origin labeling. Section three 
develops a model of heterogeneous consumers that view COOL as a horizontal attribute and 
examines the market and consumer welfare effects of mandatory and voluntary country of origin 
labeling. Section four summaries the main findings and concludes the study. 
2.  The market and consumer welfare effects of mandatory and voluntary COOL when 
COOL is viewed as a vertical attribute 
2.1 Model  Assumptions 
The model is developed to capture the case where consumers use information concerning a 
product’s country of origin as an indicator of the product’s quality. In this context, quality refers to 
both observable (search and experience) and unobservable (credence) product attributes. Considered 
a market where a product, A, is available in two different forms related to its origin; domestically 
produced and imported. It is assumed that when consumers are informed about the product’s   8
country of origin they perceive the domestic version of product A as the high quality product and 
the imported one as the low quality product.
6 In this context, the domestic and the imported versions 
of product A are treated by consumers as vertically differentiated products; if offered at the same 
price all consumers prefer the high quality domestic product. In this market, a substitute for product 
A is also available. It is assumed that the substitute product is a product that is not covered by the 
mandatory country of origin labeling regulation
7. 
Consumers are assumed to be heterogeneous, uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1], 
each buying one unit of their preferred product and the purchasing decision represents a small share 
of their budget. The utility function of the consumer is then given by: 
(1)  s s p U U − =     If a unit of a substitute product is consumed 
(2)  C q p U U i i i + − =   If a unit of the imported product is consumed 
(3)  C q p U U d d d + − =   If a unit of the domestic product is consumed 
where  s U ,  i U  and  d U  are the per unit utilities associated with the consumption of the substitute, 
imported and domestic versions of product, A, respectively. The parameter U  is the per unit base 
level of utility derived from the consumption of product, A, and its substitute and it is constant 
across consumers. The terms  , , i s p p  and  d p  denote the prices of the substitute, imported and 
domestic product, respectively. The parameter C  captures heterogeneous consumer preferences 
(and thus, differences in the willingness to pay) toward the importance that consumers place on the 
country of origin information as an indicator of evaluating product quality. It is assumed that the 
differentiating consumer attribute, C , is uniformly distributed with unit density f(C) =1 in the 
                                                 
6 Notice that the assumption as to which product is the high quality product (i.e., the domestic or the imported) does not 
change the qualitative nature of the results.  
7 Notice that mandatory country of origin regulation does not cover all food products, and thus, it is possible for a 
covered product to have a substitute non-labeled product in the market (e.g., beef is covered by COOL while chicken is 
not covered). In addition, this assumption greatly simplifies the analysis when voluntary country of origin labeling is 
examined.    9
interval  [0,1] C∈  and that the greater is C , the greater is the consumer reliance on country of origin 
information as a means of distinguishing between product qualities. Thus, consumers with higher C  
values derive greater utility from consuming a product that bears country of origin labeling and 
have higher willingness to pay for such a product, compared to consumers with low C  values. Note 
that consumers with a value of C  equal to zero place no value on the provision of information 
regarding the product’s country of origin and are thus indifferent between consuming products with 
or without country of origin labeling when these products are offered at the same price. The terms 
i q  and  d q  are non-negative utility enhancement factors associated with the consumption of the 
imported and domestic versions of product, A, respectively. It is assumed that  i d q q > , that is, that 
the domestic product is perceived to be of a higher quality than the imported product. Thus, for a 
consumer with attribute C , the terms  C qi and  C qd  give the utility enhancement from consuming 
the imported and domestic versions of product A, respectively. For simplicity and without loss of 
generality, it is assumed that the utility enhancement parameter of the substitute product ( s q ) is 
equal to zero; thus, the substitute product is the product with the lowest quality in the market 
considered.  
2.2  The Effect of Country of Origin Labeling on Consumer Purchasing Decisions and 
Welfare  
2.2.1   Consumer Purchasing Decisions and Welfare under No Country of Origin Labeling 
Without labeling (mandatory or voluntary) the imported and the domestic versions of product, A, 
are marketed together as a non-labeled product and sold at the same price, denoted by  nl p , as 
consumers are unable to determine the origin of the product at the point of purchase. Thus, 
consumers have a choice between the non-labeled product, A, and the substitute product. If 
consumers can assign a probability, denoted by ϕ , that the non-labeled product is domestically   10
produced, the utility derived from the consumption of one unit of the non-labeled product is given 
by: 
(4)  C q p U U nl nl nl + − =  
where  i d nl q q q ) 1 ( ϕ ϕ − + = .
8 In equation (4)  nl U  is the expected utility associated with the unit 
consumption of the non-labeled product. For any value of ϕ , the term  nl q  is a non-negative utility 
enhancement factor associated with the consumption of the non-labeled product. The greater is the 
probability that the non-labeled product is domestically produced, the higher is the utility derived 
from its consumption. Since when φ=1 the utility enhancement factor  d nl q q = , and when φ=0 the 
utility enhancement factor  i nl q q = , it follows that  [ , ] nl i d qq q ∈ . 
In the absence of country of origin labeling a consumer’s purchasing decision is determined 
by comparing the utilities derived from consuming the non-labeled product and its substitute. The 







=  is indifference between consuming the 
non-labeled product and its substitute (i.e., at 
N C1 ˆ   nl s U U = ). Consumers with characteristics 
[ )
N C C 1 ˆ , 0 ∈  find it optimal to buy the substitute product, while consumers with characteristics 
( ] 1 , ˆ
1
N C C ∈  find it optimal to buy the non-labeled product. Since consumers are uniformly 
distributed in the interval [0,1], buying only one unit of their preferred product, and the purchasing 
decision represents a small amount of their budget, the indifferent consumer 
N C1 ˆ  determines the 
                                                 
8Note that when consumers are ignorant as to the possible origin of the product (i.e., they cannot assign a probability to 
the product’s possible origin), consumers still get utility enhancement from consuming the non-labeled product since 
the product can be either imported or domestically produced. The utility received from consuming one unit of the non-
labeled product is in this case equal to 
nl nl nl q p U U ′ + − = ′ , where 
nl q′  is a non-negative utility enhancement factor 
associated with the consumption of the non-labeled product. Under this case, the qualitative results will be equivalent to 
the results where consumers are able to assign a probability to the origin of the non-labeled product.   11
market share of the substitute product 
N
s X  while 
N C1 ˆ 1−  the market share of the non-labeled 
product 
N


















= − =1  
Equation (5) indicates that for the substitute product to have a positive market share its 
price,  s p , should be less than the price of the non-labeled product,  nl p , which is consistent with the 
assumption that the substitute product is the lowest quality product in this market. The smaller is the 
price difference between the substitute and the non-labeled product, the greater is the market share 
of the non-labeled product. Equation (6) indicates that for the non-labeled product to have a positive 
market share its price,  nl p , should be less than  s nl p q + ; otherwise the utility curve of the non-
labeled product lies below the utility curve of the substitute product for all values of C and all 
consumers find it optimal to buy the substitute product. Figure 1 illustrates consumption decisions 
and welfare when  nl s p p <  so that both products enjoy a positive market share. The aggregate 
consumer welfare is determined by the area below the effective utility curve, which is depicted by 
the kinked dashed line in Figure 1.   12
 
  Normalizing the mass of consumers to one, the market shares 
N
s X  and 
N
nl X  represent the 
demands for the substitute and the non-labeled products, respectively (Mussa and Rosen 1978). By 
solving equation (6) for the price  nl p  we obtain the inverse demand for the non-labeled product, 
N
nl nl s nl nl
N
nl X q p q p D − + = : ) (  
2.2.2 Consumer Purchasing Decisions and Welfare under Mandatory Country of Origin 
Labeling 
Under mandatory country of origin labeling, all covered products should be labeled with respect to 
their country of origin at the retail level. In this case, consumers are able to distinguish and choose 
among the domestically produced, imported and substitute products depending on their preferences. 
Consumer purchasing decisions under mandatory COOL are determined by comparing the utilities 
derived from consuming the three products represented by equations (1), (2) and (3). The 
distribution of consumer preferences, the value that consumers place on the country of origin 
  0                      
N C1 ˆ                                                                                           1   
s p U −  
nl p U −  
nl q
C q p U nl nl + −
N





Figure 1.  Purchasing Decisions and Consumer Welfare under No COOL   13
attribute and the price of the domestically produced, imported and substitute products determine the 
market share of these products. 
To keep the analysis simple, free entry and no market power in all product markets is 
assumed throughout the analysis, which imply that the market equilibrium is determined by the 
intersection of a horizontal MC  curve and the market demand curve. Note that, the above 
assumptions guarantee that when the price of one of the products considered in this analysis 
increases (e.g., due to an increase in production or labeling costs) the prices of the remaining 
products remain unaffected, even though their production shares change. 
Part or all of the costs associated with the supply of the product in the market, including 
production and labeling costs, may be transferred to the consumer through the product price. The 
cost of country of origin labeling may increase the price of the covered product, and thus, it is 
assumed that the price of the labeled product, A (imported or domestic) is higher than the price of 
the non-labeled product, A. In addition, as suggested in the literature, the cost of implementing 
country of origin labeling is expected to be higher for the imported than the domestic product 
(USDA/AMS 2003). Therefore, it is assumed that for the imported product to be priced cheaper 
than the domestically produced product, its production cost should be lower than the production 
cost of the domestically produced product (given the assumption of no market power in all product 
supply chains).  







= 1 ˆ , is 
indifferent between consuming a unit of the substitute and a unit of the imported product (i.e., 












= 2 ˆ , is 
indifferent between consuming a unit of the imported and a unit of the domestically produced   14




i C U C U 2 2 ˆ ˆ = ). Consumers with relatively weak preferences for country of origin 
labeling (i.e., consumers with characteristics  [ )
M C C 1 ˆ , 0 ∈ ), keep buying the substitute product, 
consumers with medium preferences for country of origin labeling (i.e., consumer with 
characteristics  ( )
M M C C C 2 1 ˆ , ˆ ∈ ), find it optimal to consume the imported labeled product and 
consumers with strong preference for country of origin labeling (i.e., consumer with characteristics 
( ] 1 , ˆ
2
M C C ∈ ), find it optimal to consume the domestic product. In this case, 
M C1 ˆ , 
M M C C 1 2 ˆ ˆ −  and 
M C2 ˆ 1−  give the consumption share of the substitute, 
M
s X , the imported, 
M
i X , and the domestic 
product, 
M
d X , respectively. The above consumption shares are given by equations (7), (8) and (9).  
(7) 
i





= = 1 ˆ  
(8)  ()
() i d i
i d s d i i d M
i q q q





(9)  () ( )
() i d
i d i d M
d q q





Figure 2 depicts the effective utility curves under mandatory country of origin labeling when 
s id p pp << and consumer preferences are such that all three products capture positive market 
shares. Aggregate consumer welfare is determined by the area below the effective utility curve, 
which is depicted by the kinked dashed line in Figure 2.   15
 
The market shares of any of the three products clearly depend on consumer preferences and 
product prices. The increase in the cost of any product may increase the price of this product, and 
switch consumer preference from consuming the relatively more expensive product to the relatively 
less expensive product
9. For instance, equation (7) indicates that when the price of the substitute 
product increases, ceteris paribus, and this increase is high enough so that the price of the substitute 
product is higher than or equal to the price of the imported product, the utility curve of the substitute 
product lies underneath the utility curve of the imported product in Figure 2 and the substitute 
product is driven out of the market (i.e., 0 =
M
s X ). In this case, consumers with weak preferences 
for the product’s country of origin find it optimal to switch their consumption from the substitute to 
the imported product since the imported product is ranked by all consumers as a product of higher 
quality to the substitute product. 
                                                 
9 Recall that due to the assumptions of free entry and no market power in the supply chains of the products examined, an 
increase in the price of one product will not cause the price of the other products to change.  
M
s X                                                     
M
i X                                                  
M
d X                       
d d q p U + −
i i q p U + −
i q  
 
d q  
s p U −  
0                         
M C1 ˆ                                          
M C2 ˆ                                           1 
Consumer 
utility  
s p U −  
 
i p U −  
 
d p U −  
Figure 2.  Purchasing Decisions and Consumer Welfare under Mandatory COOL  16
Similarly, equation (8) indicates that for the imported product to have a positive market 
share its price, i p , should be less than  ( )
d
i d s i d
q
q q p q p − +
 and/or the consumer preference 







; otherwise, the utility 
curve of the imported product in Figure 2 lies underneath the utility curves of the domestic product 
and/or the substitute product for all consumers. In this latter case, consumers find it optimal to 
switch their consumption from the imported product to the substitute and domestically produced 
products. 
Equation (9) indicates that for the domestic product to have a positive market share its price, 
d p , should be less than  i d i q q p − +  and/or the consumer preference parameter for the domestic 
product,  d q , should be greater than  i i d q p p + − ; otherwise, the utility curve of the domestic product 
lies underneath the utility curve of the imported product in Figure 2. In this latter case, consumers 
with characteristics  ( ] 1 , ˆ
2
M C C∈  find it optimal to switch their consumption from the domestically 
produced to the imported product, and the market share of the domestic product, 
M
d X , is equal to 
zero. 
2.2.3 Consumer Purchasing Decisions and Welfare under Voluntary Country of Origin Labeling 
Under voluntary country of origin labeling, both the labeled and non-labeled products may be 
available in the market along with the substitute product. For simplicity it is assumed that the prices 
of the labeled products under the voluntary and the mandatory country of origin regimes are the 
same. Consumer purchasing decisions under voluntary COOL are determined by comparing the 
utilities derived from consuming the substitute (equation (1)), the non-labeled (equation (4)), the 
imported (equation (2)) and the domestically produced (equation (3)) products.    17
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As explained previously, the market shares of the substitute, the non-labeled, the imported and the 
domestically produced products, 
V
s X , 
V
nl X , 
V
i X  and 
V
d X , are equal to 
V C1 ˆ , 
V V C C 1 2 ˆ ˆ − , 
V V C C 2 3 ˆ ˆ −  and 
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(12)  () ( ) ( )
() () nl i i d
nl i d i d nl nl d i V
i q q q q
p p q p p q p p q
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− −
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=  
(13)  () ( )
() i d
i d i d V
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Equation (10) indicates that the greater is the probability that the non-labeled product is 
domestically produced, the greater is the consumer preference for the non-labeled product,  nl q , and 
the smaller is the market share of the substitute product, 
V
s X . For any positive quantity of the 
substitute product to be demanded,  s p  should be less than  nl p . Similarly, equation (11) indicates   18
that for the non-labeled product to have a positive market share its price,  nl p , should be less than 
()
i
s i s i nl
q
p q p p q + −
 and/or the consumer preference parameter for the non-labeled product,  nl q , 







. Equation (12) shows that for the imported product to have a 
positive market share its price,  i p , should be less than  ( ) ( )
() nl d
i d nl nl i d
q q
q q p q q p
−
− + −
 and/or the 
consumer preference parameter for the imported product,  i q , should be greater than 
() ( )
() nl d
nl i d i d nl
p p
p p q p p q
−
− + −
. Finally, equation (13) shows that for the domestic product to have a 
positive market share its price,  d p , should be less than  ( ) i d i q q p − +  and/or its consumer preference 
parameter,  d q , should be greater than  ( ) i d i p q q − + . 
Figure 3 depicts the effective utility curves under voluntary country of origin labeling when 
d i nl s p p p p < < <  and consumer preferences are such that all four products enjoy a positive market 
share. The aggregate consumer welfare is determined by the area below the effective utility curve, 
which is depicted by the kinked dashed curve in Figure 3. 
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2.3   Welfare Effects of Changes in the Products’ Labeling Regime  
2.3.1  Welfare Effects of a Change from a No Labeling to a Mandatory Country of Origin 
Labeling Regime 
Figure 4 depicts the effective utility curves under no country of origin labeling and mandatory 
country of origin labeling, when  d i nl s p p p p < < <  and the preference parameters are such that the 
substitute and the non-labeled products have a positive market share under no COOL and the 
substitute, imported and domestically produced products have a positive market share under 
mandatory COOL.  
 
d q  
i q
nl q
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V C1 ˆ             
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Figure 3.  Purchasing Decisions and Consumer Welfare under Voluntary COOL   20
 
Aggregate consumer welfare under no COOL is determined by the area under the dashed 
kinked curve and aggregate consumer welfare under mandatory COOL is determined by the area 
under the solid kinked curve. The introduction of mandatory country of origin labeling decreases 
consumer welfare by the dotted area (D) and increases it by the vertically hatched area (I ) in 
Figure 4. The increase in consumer welfare under mandatory country of origin labeling results from 
an increase in the utility of consumers with medium to high C  values (i.e., consumers with 
( ] 1 , a C C ∈  in Figure 4), since the utility increase from the consumption of the labeled imported and 
domestically produced products exceeds the utility discount from their higher prices. The decrease 
in consumer welfare under mandatory country of origin labeling results from a decrease in the 
utility of consumers with low to medium C  values (i.e., consumers with  [ ) a
N C C C , ˆ
1 ∈  in Figure 4), 
nl q  
i q  
d q  
N
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Figure 4.  Market and Welfare Effect of a Change from a No COOL to a 
Mandatory COOL Regime   21
who are no longer able to consume the cheaper non-labeled product. The welfare loss due to 
mandatory COOL results from a decrease in the utility of two different groups of consumers; the 
first group is located between ( )
M N C C 1 1 ˆ , ˆ  and they find it optimal to switch their consumption from 
their preferred non-labeled product, which is no longer available, to the substitute product, which 
despite being cheaper, is viewed as being inferior to the non-labeled product; the second group is 
located between ( ) a
M C C , ˆ
1  and they find it optimal to switch their consumption from the non-labeled 
product which is no longer available to the imported product, which, despite being viewed as 
superior to the non-labeled product, is more expensive. 
The net effect of introducing mandatory COOL on the aggregate consumer welfare clearly 
depends on consumer preferences and product prices. In addition, it has been assumed that 
consumers are uniformly distributed between zero and one. Relaxing this assumption has welfare 
implications. Thus, if the distribution is skewed to the left (i.e., more consumers are located closer 
to zero and have weak preferences for country of origin labeling), the decrease in consumer welfare 
will be greater. Figure 4 depicts the case where the net welfare effect of introducing mandatory 
COOL is positive.  
Note that, an increase in the price of the imported product,  i p , will increase the loss in 
consumer welfare (area D) and increase the demand for the substitute and domestic products, and 
vice versa. An increase in the price of the domestic product,  d p , will reduce the gain in consumer 
welfare (area I) and increase the demand for the imported product. The greater is the cost of country 
of origin labeling, the greater are the prices of the imported and domestically produced products, 
and the smaller is the consumer welfare gains from consuming these products. Obviously, if the 
prices of the imported and domestically produced products, i p  and  d p , respectively, are high, such 
that their utility curves lie below the utility curve of the non-labeled product, the introduction of   22
mandatory COOL will have a negative effect on the aggregate consumer welfare. The greater are 
the utility enhancement parameters,  i q  and  d q , from consuming the imported and the domestically 
produced products under mandatory country of origin labeling, the greater is the gain (area I) and 
the smaller is the loss (area D) in consumer welfare. The greater is the probability ϕ  that the non-
labeled product is domestically produced, the greater is the utility received from consuming the 
non-labeled product and the smaller is the utility received from introducing mandatory country of 
origin labeling. 
2.3.2 Welfare Effects of a Change from a No Labeling to a Voluntary Country of Origin Labeling 
Regime 
Figure 5 depicts the effective utility curves under no labeling and voluntary country of origin 
labeling, when  d i nl s p p p p < < <  and the preference parameters are such that the substitute and 
the non-labeled products have positive market shares under no COOL and the substitute, the 
imported and the domestically produced products have positive share in the market under voluntary 
COOL.   23
 
Aggregate consumer welfare under no country of origin labeling is determined by the area 
below the dashed kinked curve and aggregate consumer welfare under voluntary country of origin 
labeling is determined by the area below the solid kinked curve in Figure 5. The introduction of 
voluntary country of origin labeling results in an undisputed increase in the aggregate consumer 
welfare, given by the vertically hatched area (E) in Figure 5. The increase in consumer welfare 
under voluntary country of origin labeling results from an increase in the utility of consumers with 
medium to high preference for country of origin labeling (i.e., consumers with  ( ] 1 , ˆ
2
V C C ∈  in Figure 
5). For this group of consumers, the utility increase from consuming the labeled imported and 
domestic products exceeds the utility discount due to their higher prices. Consumers with low to 
medium preference for country of origin labeling (i.e., consumers with  ( )
V C C 2 ˆ , 0 ∈  in Figure 5) 
V
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d q  
i q  
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Figure 5.    Market and Welfare Effect of a Change from a No COOL to a 
Voluntary COOL Regime
Consumer 
utility    24
keep buying the substitute and the non-labeled product, and thus, their welfare does not change. 
Therefore, unlike the mandatory COOL case where the non-labeled product is not available in the 
market and consumers with low to medium preferences for country of origin labeling are unable to 
consume their preferred non-labeled product and have to switch their consumption either to the 
perceived inferior substitute product or to the more expensive imported product, thus incurring a 
utility loss; voluntary COOL allows all consumers to choose their preferred product and a utility 
loss does not occur. 
Note that, if the prices of the imported and the domestically produced product,  i p  and  d p , 
respectively, are high such that their utility curves lie underneath the utility curve of the non-labeled 
product, aggregate consumer welfare will not be affected by the introduction of voluntary country 
of origin labeling, as consumers will not alter their consumption decisions, i.e., they will keep 
purchasing either the substitute or the non-labeled product. The greater are the utility enhancement 
parameters,  i q  and  d q , associated with the consumption of the imported and the domestically 
produced products, respectively, the greater is the gain from introducing voluntary country of origin 
labeling.  
2.3.3 Welfare Effects of a Change from a Voluntary to a Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling 
Regime 
Note that it is assumed that the prices of the domestically produced and imported products will be 
the same under mandatory and voluntary labeling. Thus, it is implicitly assumed that under 
mandatory COOL only the producers for whom the cost of COOL does not exceed the benefits of 
the program will find it profitable to supply in the market (the rest will have to exit the market) and 
these producers will also find it profitable to voluntarily label their produce when mandatory COOL 
is not imposed. As a consequence, the market quantities of the imported and domestically produced   25
products will be the same under voluntary and mandatory COOL implying that the prices of these 
products will be the same under voluntary and mandatory COOL.  
Figure 6 depicts the effective utility curves under mandatory and voluntary country of origin 
labeling, when  d i nl s p p p p < < <  and the preference parameters are such that the substitute, the 
non-labeled, imported and domestically produced products have positive market shares under 
voluntary COOL, and the substitute, the imported and the domestically produced products have 
positive market shares under mandatory COOL. 
 
Aggregate consumer welfare under voluntary COOL is determined by the area below the 
solid kinked curve and aggregate consumer welfare under mandatory COOL is determined by the 
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market share of the non-labeled product is captured by the substitute and the labeled imported 
products in Figure 6. In this case, the introduction of mandatory country of origin labeling decreases 
consumer welfare by the dotted area (L) in Figure 6. The decrease in consumer welfare under 
mandatory country of origin labeling results from a decrease in the utility derived by consumers 
with characteristics  () 12 ˆˆ ,
VV CC C ∈  that are no longer able to consume their preferred non-labeled 
product. These consumers are divided into two groups; the first group with low to medium 
preference for country of origin labeling (i.e., consumers with characteristics  () 11 ˆˆ ,
VM CC C ∈ ) find it 
optimal to consume the cheaper inferior substitute product while the second group with relatively 
stronger preference for country of origin labeling (i.e., consumers with characteristics 
() 12 ˆˆ ,
M V CC C ∈ ) find it optimal to consume the more expensive higher quality labeled imported 
product. 
Figure 6 depicts the case where the net effect of the switch from a voluntary to a mandatory 
regime on the aggregate consumer welfare is negative. The negative effect (area L) is a result of a 
decrease in the utility of consumers that were able to consume their preferred non-labeled product 
under voluntary COOL, but are unable to do so under mandatory COOL. Note that the size of the 
negative effect (area L) can be reduced if the difference between the prices of and/or consumer 
preferences towards the non-labeled and labeled products (imported and domestically produced) is 
small. Figure 6 depicts the case where the prices and the consumer preference parameters are such 
that the substitute, non-labeled, imported and domestically produced products have a positive 
market share under voluntary COOL. In this case, the negative effect (area L) can not be eliminated 
since the difference in prices and/or consumer preferences for the non-labeled and labeled products 
exists. Under voluntary COOL, if the price of the non-labeled product,  nl p , is greater than   27
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, the non-labeled product will be driven out of the market (
V
nl X =0). In this case, only 
the substitute and the labeled products (imported and domestically produced) will be supplied in the 
market under voluntary COOL and the switch from voluntary to mandatory COOL will keep 
consumer welfare unchanged (area L in Figure 6 will disappear).  
3.  The market and consumer welfare effects of mandatory and voluntary COOL when 
COOL is viewed as a horizontal attribute 
In the vertically differentiated product market examined previously, consumers use the information 
concerning the country of origin of a product as an indicator of the product’s quality and all 
consumers can uniformly rank the available products in the market in terms of the quality that they 
posses. Thus, when all products are offered at the same price only the high quality product has a 
positive market share. In the vertical differentiation model differences in the willingness to pay for 
the products that are available in the market stem from consumer differences in how much they 
value quality and/or their ability to pay for their most preferred quality. 
However, country of origin labeling may be important for consumers not just for the 
information that it provides regarding a product’s production process and physical attributes, which 
are directly associated with a product’s perceived quality, but also because this information may 
allow consumers to express their support for the country’s economy through their purchasing 
decisions and may be associated with fond memories of a sense of belonging to a certain country. In 
this context, consumers may view the different product forms that are available in the market as 
different product varieties, which may be common in all other characteristics except for the country 
of their origin.   28
In this context, the product that is available in different forms related to its origin (i.e., non-
labeled, domestically produced and imported) is treated by consumers as a horizontally 
differentiated product; the different forms/varieties are not uniformly utility-ranked by all 
consumers as in the vertical differentiation case, and if they are sold for identical prices, each form 
can have a positive market share. Under this setting, the non-labeled, imported and domestically 
produced products can be viewed as having a particular location in the product characteristics space 
and each consumer has a location in this product space as well, which determines the utility derived 
from the consumption of the products that are available in the market. The horizontal differentiation 
model developed in this section captures this situation.  
3.1 Model  Assumptions 
The model that is used to examine the market where the products available (i.e., non-labeled, 
domestically produced and imported) are viewed by consumers as being horizontally differentiated 
is the unit circle model introduced by Salop (1979). In the circle model, consumers are assumed to 
be heterogeneous, uniformly distributed around a circle that is of unit circumference, each buying 
one unit of their preferred product and the purchasing decision represents a small share of their 
budget. The products available in the market are located at an equal distance from each other.
10 The 
main advantage of using Salop’s circle model rather than the commonly used Hotelling linear 
model is that the circle does not have end points; the existence of end points in Hotelling’s linear 
model causes non-existence of equilibrium in a game where firms first choose their locations and 
then compete in prices.
11 
                                                 
10 This assumption stems from the fact that the firms that supply the products in the market have an incentive to locate 
the furthest away possible from their rivals to increase their market power over consumers located near them (Carlton 
and Perloff 2004). 
11 In Hotelling’s model when two firms choose their locations, they have an incentive to locate next to each other in the 
middle of the line to capture as many consumers as possible from either side of the line while when they compete in 
prices, they have an incentive to locate the furthest away possible from each other to maximize product differentiation 
and thus relax price competition (Shy 2004).    29
Given the above, a consumer’s location in the unit circle represents her most preferred 
product variety associated with the product’s country of origin. The further away a consumer is 
located from an available product, the greater is the disutility derived from consuming that product 
(i.e., the greater is the difference between the consumer’s most preferred country of origin for a 
given product and the product origins that are available in the market). In general, the utility 
function from consuming a horizontally differentiated product,κ , where 
{non labeled,imported, domestically produced} κ= −  is given by: 
(14)  ∗ − − − = R R t p U U κ κ κ  
where  κ U  is the per unit utility associated with the consumption of product κ . The parameter U  is 
per unit base level of utility derived from the consumption of any form of product κ  and it is 
constant across consumers. The parameter  κ p  denotes the price of product κ , while the term t is 
the rate at which consumer utility decreases as a consumer is unable to consume her most preferred 
product of origin. In other words, t is associated with the disutility derived from not consuming the 
ideal product of origin and it is assumed to be constant across all consumers. The term  * R  denotes 
a consumer’s most preferred product form, regarding the product’s country of origin. Finally, 
∗ − R Rκ  is the distance between the product  κ R  and the consumer’s favorite product  ∗ R . To keep 
the analysis simple, it is assumed that the utility derived from consuming product κ  is greater than 
the utility derived from consuming a substitute product for all consumers located on the circle. That 
is,  0 s UU pt RR U κκ κ =− − − ∗ > ≥ .  
3.2   The Effect of Country of Origin Labeling on Consumer Purchasing Decisions and 
Welfare  
3.2.1 Consumer Purchasing Decisions and Welfare under No Country of Origin Labeling   30
Under no country of origin labeling, all product forms (non-labeled, imported and domestically 
produced) are marketed together as a non-labeled product and sold at the same price. Figure 7 
illustrates the horizontally differentiated product space under no country of origin labeling.  
 
The utility function of the non-labeled product is given by: 




nl     If a unit of the non-labeled product is consumed  
where 
N
nl U  is the per unit utility associated with the consumption of the non-labeled product under 
no COOL,  nl p , denotes the price of the non-labeled product and 
N
nl R  is the location of the non-
labeled product under no COOL. All other parameters are as previously defined. Figure 8 depicts 
the effective utility curve under no country of origin labeling where the horizontally differentiated 
product circle is stretched into a line. 
N
nl R  
Non-labeled product
Under No COOL 
Figure 7.    The Horizontally Differentiated Product Space under No COOL 
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In Figure 8 consumers located at 
N
nl R  receive the maximum utility from consuming the non-
labeled product (i.e., the consumers’ most preferred product form is the non-labeled product). The 
utility received at 
N
nl R  is equal to  nl p U − . The further away the consumer is located from 
N
nl R , the 
lower is the utility received from consuming the non-labeled product. Given our assumption that the 
substitute product is viewed as inferior by all consumers on the circle, Figure 8 depicts the case 
where the non-labeled product dominates the market and all consumers participate in the market 
(i.e., 0 ≥ > s nl U U  for all consumers on the circle).
12 Thus, the non-labeled product will capture all 







≤ ∗ − . Due to symmetry, the market share of the 
non-labeled product 
N
nl χ  is then given by: 
                                                 
12 It is thus assumed that the consumer who is indifferent to the choice between participating and not participating in the 
market, i.e., the consumer with utility  0 nl U = , will participate in the market.  







utility under no COOL 
nl p U −
Figure 8.     Consumer Purchasing Decisions under No COOL   32









= ∗ − = 2 2 χ  
Equation (16) indicates that when  nl p  and t increase and/or U  decreases, the market share of the 
non-labeled product decreases. The market share of the non-labeled product is equal to zero when 
nl p U = ; that is, when the product is priced such that the consumer consuming her most preferred 
product (the consumer located at 
N
nl R ) derives zero utility from the product’s consumption (i.e., the 
consumer has all her surplus extracted). 
Normalizing the mass of the consumers to one, the market share of the non-labeled product, 
N
nl χ , represents the demand for non-labeled product (Mussa and Rosen 1978). By solving equation 










− = = . The aggregate consumer welfare is determined by the area below the 
effective utility curve, which is depicted by the kinked dashed line in Figure 8. 
3.2.2 Consumer Purchasing Decisions and Welfare under Mandatory Country of Origin 
Labeling 
Under mandatory country of origin labeling, all the covered products should be labeled with their 
country of origin. In this case, the non-labeled product is not available in the market and consumer 
purchasing decisions consist of buying the imported or the domestically produced product.  
According to the assumption that the available products are located on a unit circle and are 
equidistant from each other, the distance between the imported product, 
M
i R , and the domestically 
produced product, 
M
d R , is  1
2 . Figure 9 illustrates the horizontally differentiated product space 
under mandatory country of origin labeling, where both the imported and the domestically produced 
products, 
M
i R  and 
M
d R , respectively, are available in the market.   33
 
Consumer purchasing decisions under mandatory COOL are determined by comparing the 
utilities derived from consuming the two products represented by equations (17) and (18).  




i     If a unit of the imported product is consumed 




d     If a unit of the domestic product is consumed 
where 
M
i U  and 
M
d U  are the per unit utilities associated with the consumption of the imported and 
the domestically produced products, respectively. The parameters  i p  and  d p  denote the prices of 
the imported and domestically produced products, respectively. All other parameters are as 
previously defined.  
Figure 10 depicts the effective utility curves under mandatory country of origin labeling 
where the horizontally differentiated product circle is stretched into a line, all consumers participate 
in the market,  d i p p <
13 and both products have positive market shares. 
 
                                                 
13 Note that this assumption does not change the qualitative nature of our results and is made for consistency with the 
vertical differentiation model where  id pp <  ensured that the imported product would capture a positive market share 
(i.e., general case). In the horizontally differentiated model where consumers cannot uniformly rank the products, 
however, even when the prices of the imported and domestically produced product are equal, both products would have 
a positive market share. 
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Figure 9.  The Horizontally Differentiated Product Space under Mandatory COOL   34
 
In Figure 10 consumers located at 
M
d R  and 
M
i R  receive maximum utility from consuming 
the domestically produced and imported products, respectively. The utility received at  d R  and  i R  is 
equal to  d p U −  and  i p U − , respectively. The intersection of the domestically produced and the 
imported product curves at 
M R1 ˆ  corresponds to the consumer who is indifferent between consuming 
the domestically produced and the imported product and receives the same utility from her 
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d i M , is indifferent between consuming a 
unit of the domestically produced and imported products (same interpretation for the other segment 
of the circle). Thus, consumers located in the interval  ( )
M
d R R R 1 ˆ , ∈  prefer the domestically 
produced product and receive utility  d U , while consumers located in the interval  ( ) i
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Figure 10.  Purchasing Decisions and Consumer Welfare under Mandatory COOL   35
prefer the imported product and receive utility  i U . Due to symmetry, the market share of the 
domestically produced product 
M
d χ  is equal to 
M R1 ˆ 2 ; recall that the domestic product has 








p p d i M
d χ  
Similarly the market share of the imported product 
M












p p i d M
i χ  
Aggregate consumer welfare is determined by the area below the effective utility curve, which is 
depicted by the kinked dashed line in Figure 10. 
  Equations (19) and (20) indicate that when the price of the domestically produced,  d p  and 
imported products,  i p   increases and/or the rate of disutility t increases, the market share of this 
product decreases. Note that, when  i d p p = , each of the domestically produced and imported 
products receives a positive market share equal to  1
2 . The steeper are the utility curves in Figure 
10, that is, the greater is t, the lower is the market share gain from a price decrease. Conversely, a 
small t makes a price decrease more tempting, as it leads to greater market share gains.  
Equations (19) and (20) indicate that for the domestic product to have a positive market 
share its price  d p  should be less than 
2
t




pp ≥+  the domestic product 
is driven out of the market,  0
M
d χ = , and the imported product captures the entire market,  1
M
i χ = . 
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3.2.3 Consumer Purchasing Decisions and Welfare under Voluntary Country of Origin Labeling  
Under voluntary country of origin labeling, the non-labeled, imported and domestically produced 
products may all be available in the market. Given that the available products are located on a unit 
circle and at an equal distance from each other, the distance between them is  1
3 . Figure 11 
illustrates the horizontally differentiated product space under voluntary country of origin labeling, 
where the non-labeled, 
V
nl R , domestically produced, 
V
d R , and imported,
V
i R , products are available in 
the market. 
 
Consumer purchasing decisions under voluntary COOL are determined by comparing the 
utilities derived from consuming the three products, represented by equations (21), (22) and (23). 




nl     If a unit of the non-labeled product is consumed 




i     If a unit of the imported product is consumed 
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Figure 11.  The Horizontally Differentiated Product Space under Voluntary COOL 
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where 
V
nl U , 
V
i U  and 
V
d U  are the per unit utilities associated with the consumption of the non-
labeled, imported and domestically produced products, respectively. The parameters  nl p ,  i p  and 
d p  denote the prices of the non-labeled, imported and domestically produced products, 
respectively. All other parameters are as previously defined. 
Figure 12 depicts the effective utility curves under voluntary country of origin labeling, 
where the horizontally differentiated product circle is stretched into a line, all consumers participate 
in the market,  d i nl p p p < <  and the non-labeled, the domestically produced and the imported 
products all have positive market shares. 
 
In Figure 12, consumers located at, 
V
nl R , 
V
d R  and 
V
i R  receive maximum utility from 
consuming the non-labeled, domestically produced and imported products, respectively. The utility 
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Figure 12.  Purchasing Decisions and Consumer Welfare under Voluntary COOL   38
received at 
V
d R , 
V
nl R  and 
V
i R  is equal to  d p U − ,  nl p U −  and  i p U − , respectively. The consumer 
with the differentiating characteristic 











nl d V  and is indifferent between 
consuming one unit of the domestically produced and non-labeled products (i.e., 
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− − − ). Finally, the consumer who is indifferent between consuming 
one unit of the imported product and one unit of the non-labeled product and receives the same 








i R t p U R t p U 3 3 ˆ
3












i nl V ).  
In Figure 12 consumers that are located in the intervals ( )
V V
nl R R 1 ˆ ,  and ( )
V
nl
V R R , ˆ
3  prefer the 
non-labeled product; the closer is the consumer to 
V
nl R , the weaker is the consumer preference for 
the product’s origin and the greater is the utility received from consuming the non-labeled product. 
Consumers that are located in the intervals ( )
V
d
V R R , ˆ
1  and ( )
V V
d R R 2 ˆ ,  buy the domestic product; the 
closer is the consumer to 
V
d R , the greater is her utility from consuming the domestic product. 
Finally, consumers that are located is in the intervals  ) , ˆ ( 2
V
i
V R R  and  ) ˆ , ( 3
V V
i R R  prefer the imported 
product; the closer is the consumer to 
V
i R , the greater is her utility from consuming the imported 
product.   39
Given the above, the market share of the non-labeled product under voluntary COOL, 
V
nl χ , 
is equal to 
V V R R 3 1 ˆ
3
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Equations (24), (25) and (26) indicate that when  i d nl p p p = =  the non-labeled, 
domestically produced and imported products each has a positive market share equal to  1
3 . 
Aggregate consumer welfare is determined by the area below the effective utility curves, which is 
depicted by the kinked dashed curve in Figure 12. 
Equation (24) indicates that when  d p  and  i p  decrease and/or  nl p  and t increase, the 
market share of the non-labeled product, 
V
nl χ , decreases. For the non-labeled product to have a 
positive market share, its price  nl p  should be less than 
3 2
t p p i d +
+
; otherwise,  0
V
nl χ = . Similarly, 
equations (25) and (26) indicate that for the domestically produced and imported products to have a 
positive market share, their prices  d p  and  i p  should be less than 
3 2
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3.3   Welfare Effects of Changes in the Products’ Labeling Regime  
2.3.1 Welfare Effects of a Change from a No Labeling to a Mandatory Country of Origin 
Labeling Regime 
Figure 13 depicts the effective utility curves under no labeling and mandatory country of origin 
labeling, when  d i nl p p p < < , the non-labeled product has a positive market share under no country 
of origin labeling and the imported and the domestically produced products have positive market 
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Figure 13.  Market and Welfare Effect of a Change from a No COOL to a 
Mandatory COOL Regime 
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labeling is determined by the area below the dashed kinked curve in Figure 13. The introduction of 
mandatory country of origin labeling decreases consumer welfare by the dotted areas () B  and ( ) B′ , 
while increases it by the vertically hatched area ( ) A  in Figure 13. The increase in consumer welfare 
under mandatory COOL results from an increase in the utility of consumers located in the interval 
) , ( a
M
d R R , in Figure 13, who have a relatively strong preference for country of origin labeling (i.e., 
they are located closer to the imported and domestically produced labeled product). These 
consumers receive an increase in their utility under mandatory COOL as the utility received from 
the consumption of the labeled imported and domestically produced products exceeds the utility 
discount from the products’ higher prices (compared to price paid for the non-labeled product). The 
decrease in consumer welfare under mandatory COOL is due to the decrease in the utility of 
consumers located in the intervals ( )
M
d nl R R ,  and ( ) nl a R R ,  in Figure 13. The welfare loss due to 
mandatory COOL results from a decrease in the utility of consumers with weak preference for 
country of origin labeling (i.e., consumers located close to the relatively cheaper non-labeled 
product) and under mandatory COOL cannot consume their preferred non-labeled product. 
  Figure 13 depicts the case where the net effect of introducing mandatory COOL on the 
aggregate consumer welfare is negative. Notice that a decrease in the price of the labeled 
domestically produced and imported products will increase the gain in consumer welfare, area ( ) A  
and decrease the welfare loss areas, () B  and ( ) B′ , from introducing mandatory COOL. In addition, 
it has been assumed that consumers are uniformly distributed on a unit circle and the rate at which 
consumer utility is lowered as a consumer is unable to consume her most preferred product of 
origin, t, is constant across all the consumers. The relaxing of these assumptions has welfare 
implications. Thus, if the distribution of consumers is skewed near to the non-labeled product, then 
the decrease in consumer welfare will be greater as a result of the introduction of mandatory COOL.   42
In addition, if the rate at which consumer utility decreases as a consumer is unable to consume her 
most preferred product form is smaller for the non-labeled product than it is for the labeled 
domestically produced and imported product, the utility curve of the non-labeled product will be 
flatter and the decrease in consumer welfare will be greater as a result of the introduction of 
mandatory COOL.  
3.3.2 Welfare Effects of a Change from a No Labeling to a Voluntary Country of Origin Labeling 
Regime 
Figure 14 depicts the effective utility curves under no COOL and voluntary COOL, when 
d i nl p p p < < , the non-labeled product has a positive market share under no COOL and the non-
labeled, the imported and the domestically produced products have positive market shares under 
voluntary COOL.   43
 
Aggregate consumer welfare under no country of origin labeling is determined by the area 
below the solid kinked curve and aggregate consumer welfare under voluntary country of origin 
labeling is determined by the area below the dashed kinked curve in Figure 14. The introduction of 
voluntary COOL results in an undisputed increase in the aggregate consumer welfare given by the 
vertical hatched area () C  in Figure 14. 
The increase in consumer welfare under voluntary COOL results from an increase in the utility of 
consumers located in the interval ( )
V V R R 3 1 ˆ , ˆ , as shown in Figure 14, who have relatively strong 
preference for country of origin labeling (i.e., they are located close to the labeled (imported and 
domestically produced) products). For these consumers, the utility received from the consumption 
Figure 14.    Market and Welfare Effect of a Change from a No COOL to a 
Voluntary COOL Regime
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of the labeled imported and domestically produced products exceeds the utility discount from the 
products’ higher prices.  
Therefore, unlike the mandatory COOL case, where the non-labeled product is not available 
in the market and consumers with weak preferences for country of origin labeling (consumers 
located close to the non-labeled product) have to switch their consumption to the relatively more 
expensive labeled products, voluntary COOL allows consumers more choices, thus a utility loss 
does not occur. Note that an increase in the price of the labeled domestically and imported product 
and/or a decrease in the price of the non-labeled product decrease the gain in consumer welfare 
(area C ) from the introduction of voluntary COOL. 
2.3.3 Welfare Effects of a Change from a Voluntary to a Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling 
Regime 
Two cases must be considered when examining the welfare effects of a change from a voluntary to 
a mandatory country of origin labeling regime. The first case, depicted in Figure 15, considers the 
welfare effects of the change in the labeling regime when relocation of the available products is 
prohibitively costly. Thus, in this case, when the labeling regime changes from voluntary to 
mandatory labeling, the imported and domestically produced products do not change their positions 
on the unit circle. The second case, depicted in Figure 16, considers the welfare effects of a change 
in the labeling regime when relocation of the available products is possible and costless. In this 
case, the imported and domestically produced products will relocate under mandatory COOL so that 
they are located at an equal distance from each other. The case where relocation is possible and 
costly is also discussed in what follows. 
Note that, under the first case, the assumption that relocation does not occur implies that 
consumer preferences do not change because of a switch in the labeling regime; that is, the 
consumer who receives maximum utility from consuming the domestically produced or the   45
imported product is located at the same point on the circle under both voluntary and mandatory 
labeling. Under the second case, the assumption that relocation occurs implies that consumer 
preferences (i.e., their location on the unit circle) change because of a change in the labeling regime. 
Thus, when products relocate under mandatory COOL and are positioned at an equal distance from 
each other, the consumer who derives maximum utility from a product’s consumption is different 
from the consumer who derives maximum utility from the same product’s consumption under 
voluntary COOL. This situation could arise, for instance, when under voluntary COOL consumers 
do not place the same level of trust on country of origin labeling as they do when country of origin 
labeling is mandatory.  
Figure 15 depicts the effective utility curves under mandatory and voluntary country of 
origin labeling, when  d i nl p p p < < , the non-labeled, imported and domestically produced products 
have positive market shares under voluntary COOL, and the imported and domestically produced 
products have positive market shares under mandatory COOL and their location does not change 
because of a change in the labeling regime.    46
 
Aggregate consumer welfare, when relocation of the available products is prohibitively 
costly, is determined under voluntary COOL by the area below the solid kinked curve and under 
mandatory COOL by the area below the dashed kinked curve in Figure 15. Figure 15 depicts the 
case where the distance between the domestically produced and imported product is  1
3  under both 
mandatory and voluntary COOL. The introduction of mandatory COOL decreases consumer 
welfare by the dotted areas F  and F′ in  Figure 15. The decrease in consumer welfare, under 
mandatory COOL results from a decrease in the utility of consumers that are no longer able to 
consume their preferred and relatively cheaper non-labeled product, thus, they switch their 
Figure 15.  Market and Welfare Effect of a Change from a Voluntary to a 
Mandatory COOL Regime when the Locations of the Domestically 
Produced and Imported Products do not Change 
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consumption to the relatively more expensive labeled imported and domestically produced 
products. 
Figure 16 depicts the effective utility curves under mandatory and voluntary country of 
origin labeling, when  d i nl p p p < < , the non-labeled, the imported and the domestically produced 
products have positive market shares under voluntary COOL, and the imported and the domestically 
produced products have positive market shares under mandatory COOL and they relocate at an 
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Figure 16.  Market and Welfare Effect of a Change from a Voluntary to a 
Mandatory COOL Regime when the Locations of the Domestically 
Produced and Imported Products Change   48
Aggregate consumer welfare, when relocation is possible and costless, is determined under 
voluntary COOL by the area below the solid kinked curve and under mandatory COOL by the area 
below the dashed kinked curve in Figure 16. Figure 16 depicts the case where the distance between 
the domestically produced and the imported product is  1
2  under mandatory COOL and  1
3  under 
voluntary COOL. The introduction of mandatory COOL decreases consumer welfare by the dotted 
areas G , G′ and G′ ′ , while increases it by the vertical hatched areas H  and H′ in Figure 16. The 
decrease in consumer welfare, areas G  and G′ ′ , results from a decrease in the utility of consumers 
that are no longer able to consume the relatively cheaper non-labeled product and they switch their 
consumption to the relatively more expensive labeled imported and domestically produced product. 
The decrease in consumer welfare (area G′) results from a decrease in the utility of consumers that 
are still consuming the labeled products (imported and domestically produced) under mandatory 
COOL, but are located further away from the available labeled product forms under mandatory than 
under voluntary COOL as a result of the products’ relocation. The increase in consumer welfare is 
due to an increase in the utility of consumers that either switch their preferences from the non-
labeled to the labeled product, or due to the increase in the utility of consumers that place greater 
value to country of origin information under mandatory than under voluntary COOL.  
  Figure 16 depicts the case where the net effect of the switch from a voluntary to mandatory 
COOL regime is negative. Note that the size of the negative effect areas G , G′ and G′ ′  can be 
reduced if the difference in price between the non-labeled and the labeled product is small, but can 
not be eliminated even if the prices of the non-labeled and the labeled products are equal.  
  In addition, Figure 16 depicts the case where the relocation of the imported and the 
domestically produced products is possible and costless under mandatory COOL. When relocation 
is costly, however, the prices of the imported and domestic products under mandatory labeling may 
reflect these costs which will cause the effective utility curve shown by the kinked dashed curve to   49
shift downward and may eliminate the utility gain areas H  and H′ and increase the utility loss 
areas G , G′ and G′ ′ . Under this case where relocation is possible but costly and relocation costs 
are passed on to consumers the change of the labeling regime from voluntary to mandatory COOL 
will have an undisputed negative effect on consumer welfare.   
The country of origin of any given product is a credence attribute, thus, in the absence of labeling 
consumers cannot generally observe the country of origin of any given product. Labeling can be 
used as an instrument to transform credence attributes into experience and search attributes, 
differentiate products and facilitate consumer purchasing decisions.  
3.  Concluding Remarks 
Consumer attitudes towards information concerning country of origin labeling are not homogenous 
and they can differentiate products vertically or horizontally. Two theoretical models one of vertical 
and one of horizontal product differentiation were developed and were used to examine the effects 
of mandatory and voluntary country of origin labeling on consumer purchasing decisions and 
welfare.  
Under the vertical differentiation model, consumers view COOL information as an indicator 
of a product’s quality and all consumers can uniformly rank the products available in the market; 
thus, in the vertically differentiated market product quality can be viewed as an ‘objective’ product 
attribute since all consumers agree on which product possesses the highest quality in the market. 
Under the horizontal differentiation model, COOL information is not linked to the product’s quality 
in a way that allows consumers to uniformly rank the available product forms. In the horizontally 
differentiated product market consumers may use COOL information to express political and/or 
economic support for a given country, thus, their purchasing decisions may not be based only on the 
product’s attributes. The horizontal differentiation model thus allows the study of a market where   50
product quality is a subjective attribute and consumers do not agree on which product possesses the 
highest quality. 
The analytical results of the vertically differentiated product model show that the market 
effects of the introduction of mandatory and voluntary COOL depend on the relative prices of the 
products available in the market, the distribution of consumer preferences, and the value that 
consumer place on country of origin labeling information as an indicator of the product’s quality. In 
general, the greater is the price of the labeled product (imported or domestically produced) and/or 
the lower is the consumer preference for information conveyed through country of origin labeling, 
the smaller is the market share of the labeled products (imported and domestically produced) under 
both voluntary and mandatory COOL.  
The analytical results of the horizontally differentiated product model show that the market 
effects of the introduction of mandatory and voluntary COOL are determined by the relative prices 
of the products available in the market and the difference between the consumers’ most preferred 
country of origin for a given product and the product origins available in the market. When the price 
of a given product is sufficiently high and/or the difference between the consumer’s most preferred 
product origin and the product origins available in the market is sufficiently large and/or the rate of 
disutility derived when consumers are unable to consume their most preferred product of origin is 
sufficiently high, the product can be driven out of the market under both voluntary and mandatory 
COOL.   
The horizontally and the vertically differentiated product models are also used to examine 
the welfare effects of changes in the product’s labeling regimes. The analytical results of both 
models show that the change from a no COOL to a mandatory COOL regime decreases the welfare 
of consumers with weak preference for COOL, while increases the welfare of consumers with 
strong preference for COOL. The net welfare effect of the change depends on the distribution of   51
consumer preferences and the relative product prices. If, for instance, the distribution of consumer 
preference is not uniform, as it has been assumed throughout the study, but skewed such that more 
consumers have weak/strong preference for country of origin labeling then the introduction of 
mandatory COOL may lead to a decrease/increase in aggregate consumer welfare. In addition, the 
smaller/larger is the difference between the prices of the non-labeled and the labeled products 
(imported and domestically produced), the greater/smaller is the likelihood that mandatory COOL 
will lead to an increase/decrease in aggregate consumer welfare.   
Both models show that a change from a no COOL to a voluntary COOL regime leads to an 
undisputed increase in consumer welfare. Specifically, a change from a no COOL to a voluntary 
COOL regime increases the welfare of consumers with strong preference for COOL, while keeping 
the welfare of consumers with weak preference for COOL unchanged. In addition, both models 
predict that the smaller/greater is the price difference between the non-labeled and the labeled 
products (imported and domestically produced) the greater/smaller is the consumer welfare gain 
from the introduction of voluntary COOL.  
The welfare effects of a switch from a voluntary to a mandatory COOL regime differ in the 
vertically and horizontally differentiated product models depending on whether product relocation 
is possible in the horizontally differentiated product market. Thus, the analytical results of the 
vertically differentiated product model show that a change from voluntary to mandatory COOL 
leads to a net consumer welfare loss. Specifically, the introduction of mandatory COOL limits 
consumer choices since the non-labeled product is not available in the market and leads to a 
decrease in the welfare of consumers with weak preference for COOL, and it keeps the welfare of 
consumers with strong preference for COOL unchanged. The lower is the price of the non-labeled 
product under voluntary COOL, the greater is the consumer welfare loss of the introduction of 
mandatory COOL.    52
In examining the welfare effects of a change from voluntary to mandatory COOL in the 
horizontally differentiated product market two cases are considered; the case where products do not 
relocated as a result of the introduction of mandatory COOL and the case where products relocate. 
This distinction is made to capture the situation where after the introduction of mandatory COOL 
the labeled imported and domestically produced products may find it optimal to relocate to 
maximize the market shares that can be captured.  
The analytical results of the horizontally differentiated product model when the labeled 
products do not change location as a result of the switch from voluntary to mandatory COOL are 
similar to those in the vertically differentiated model. Specifically, a change from voluntary to 
mandatory COOL leads to a decrease in aggregate consumer welfare which results from a decrease 
in the welfare of consumers with weak preference for COOL, while the welfare of consumers with 
strong preference for COOL remains unchanged.  
When the labeled products change their locations as a result of the switch from voluntary to 
mandatory COOL, the welfare of consumer with both weak and strong preference for COOL 
decreases but there may be some welfare gains for consumers who place greater value in country of 
origin information under mandatory COOL than under voluntary COOL. However, even in this 
case, the net consumer welfare effects of a change from voluntary to mandatory COOL are 
negative.  
The present research focused on the effect of country of origin labeling on the demand side 
of the market under the no COOL, mandatory and voluntary COOL regimes. The results of this 
study are based on the assumption of free market entry and no market power in all product markets. 
The implication of relaxing this assumption is that a price change of one of the products considered 
(e.g., due to an increase in labeling and/or production costs) will affect the prices of the remaining   53
products and will thus affect the relative market shares and consumer welfare. The relaxing of this 
assumption is the focus of future research.  
Future research could also examine the effect of country of origin labeling on the supply 
side of the market under the no COOL, mandatory and voluntary COOL regimes. A theoretical 
framework can be developed that allows for heterogeneity of producers, processors and/or retailers 
with respect to the returns those agents can capture from implementing country of origin labeling. 
This framework can then be used to examine the welfare implications of voluntary and mandatory 
COOL for the agents in the supply chain that may be affected from a change in the labeling regime.   54
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